1 -Cooperative multihop communication can greatly increase network throughput, yet packet forwarding for other nodes involves opportunity and energy cost for relays. Thus one of the pre-requisite problems in the successful implementation of multihop transmission is how to foster cooperation among selfish nodes. Existing researches mainly adopt monetary stimulating. In this manuscript, we propose instead a simple and self-enforcing forwarding incentive scheme free of indirect monetary remunerating for asymmetric (uplink multihop, downlink single-hop) cellar network based on coalitional game theory, which comprises double compensation, namely, Inter-BEA, global stimulating policy allotting resources among relaying coalitions according to group size, and Intra-BEA, local compensating and allocating rule within coalitions. Firstly, given the global allotting policy, we introduce a fair allocation estimating approach which includes remunerating for relaying cost using Myerson value for partition function game, to enlighten the design of local allocating rules. Secondly, given the inter-and intra-BEA relay fostering approach, we check stability of coalition structures in terms of internal and external stability as well as inductive core. Theoretic analysis and numerical simulation show that our measure can provide communication opportunities for outer ring nodes and enlarge system coverage, while at the same time provide enough motivation with respect to resource allocation and energy saving for nodes in inner and middle ring to relay for own profits.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes system configuration and the global inter-coalition stimulating policy according to group size: Inter-BEA. Section 3 introduces our relaying cooperative model and analyses its properties. Section 4 estimates possible fair allocation value based on compensated Myerson value and proposes a feasible local resource allotting rule within coalitions given BS policy: Intra-BEA. We then discuss in Section 5 which cooperation structure is preferred under given BEA allocation approach. We propose coalition formation algorithm and numerical results in Section 6, so as to examine effectiveness of the proposed incentive measure. Section 7 concludes the paper. Assume that the MCN system is orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) based. To foster relaying cooperation and thereby improve coverage, BS announces an apportioning policy that allotting sub-channels according to cooperative group size (suppose in sheer single-hop (SH) mode, BS apportions all available sub-channels among all reachable active MSs (i.e., those within inner and middle ring, to equalize their share). In MCN mode, apart from SH transmitting, the system also allows following uplink modes: 3-hop transmitting (e.g., CIV in Fig.1 , i.e., relaying cooperation among 3 MSs in inner, middle and outer ring respectively) and 2-hop transmitting, including type CI (cooperation between MSs in inner and middle ring respectively), type CII (between MSs in middle and outer ring) and CIII (between MSs in inner and outer ring).
Proposed Inter-coalition incentive strategy: Inter-BEA
Generally speaking, a global resource policy aims at encouraging cooperation should meet two metrics, namely efficient (i.e., it should be able to make the most of all available resource) and effective (i.e., it should be able to provide cooperating motivation for nodes in the system). Intuitively, nodes will prefer to stay (or join in) a group as long as 1 n n > D D (i.e., a node can averagely get more in a group than staying as a singleton), namely, such an apportioning policy is effective. Denote the amount of resources allotted to a group of size n (i.e., it has n members) as n D , we propose an incentive measure as follows: Normalize the total resources (number of sub-channels) in the system to 1, and assume that all sub-channels are apportioned among all active and reachable MSs. For feasible group size
(1, 2, 3) sz = supported by the system, BS allots resources (i.e. subchannels) according to ratio: Apportioning (Inter-BEA) mechanism. We comment that our approach is inherently efficient considering the above assumption, and we will further examine its effectiveness in subsection 3.1 by theorem 1 (in the sense of negative externality and no free-ride), in Section 5 (in the sense of coalition structure stability) and in Section 6 by simulation.
It's worth to point out that although we only present our research in terms of OFDMA in particular, Our incentive mechanism is in fact general enough to be applied in systems such as TDMA or CDMA, either by means of sub-slotting; i.e.
the basic resource unit, the time-slot, is divided into source and relay subslots, or by means of sub-coding and multi-code transmissions.
Assume that MSs are all rational and selfish in that each of them would like to obtain more sub-channels and cost less energy. Given the apportioning policy of the BS, MSs in the outer ring would seek to find possible relays in middle or inner ring, so as to secure some communication opportunity; those in the inner ring would choose if they will relay for others and MSs in the middle ring can weigh the alternatives of whether or not to relay for MSs in outer ring, and whether or not to seek possible help from MSs in inner ring.
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Restricted relaying cooperation in partition function form
Under the particular configuration and Inter-group apportioning policy, rough examination shows that our model bears the following characteristics:
Restricted cooperation [12, 15, 16, 19, 23] . Since a source and its direct relay must within each other's transmission range, apparently a node can only cooperate with those falling within its neighbor area. Games with restricted cooperation describe situations in which the players are not completely free in forming coalitions; the restrictions in our model are mainly attributed to topology, namely the relative position of MSs. To manage these situations, a coalition set is generally introduced to represent the set of all feasible cooperative groups among the nodes.
Externalities [17, 20] : Noted that given the apportioning policy in Eq. (1), the action of merging (relaying coalition formation) among 2 or 3 MSs will affect payoffs of those nodes not involved in the mergence. These externalities can be captured in the framework of partition function game (PFG) [25] quite easily.
There can be two special cases of externalities: positive and negative externalities, meaning that when a mergence occurs, all the players who are not involved in a mergence are better (worse) off, more formally, Definition 1(Positive/negative externality games [11, 13, 22, 24] ) the following condition characterizes a positive (negative) externality game: Assume that CS ' π was created from CS ' ≠ π π by a mergence of certain (possibly also trivial) coalitions that consist of k players, k ∈ N .If the allocation function (.) φ is defined in terms of payoffs: ( ') ( )
Combining the above judgment, we conclude that our model pertains to a kind of There can be all together 4 kinds of mergence: CI ~ CIV in Fig.1 , in which CII ~ CIV involve an introduction of a MS within the outer ring (which is originally not an active node) while CI type not.
Firstly, if the mergence belongs to a CI type, before merging, the sub-channels allotted to the 2 involved nodes sum to P 2σ = .
After the merging, the number of SC, DC and TC become n n = respectively,
, the sub-channels allotted to the newly formed DC (by the 2 merged nodes) are
.,this can always be satisfied under the condition of
2, 0 n n n = × > ), i.e., P' is always greater than P, meaning that the mergence brings positive gain in payoffs for the involved members in a whole, since all available sub-channels are (normalized to)1, the payoffs to the residual nodes that not involved in the mergence apparently decrease after the merging.
Secondly, if the mergence belongs to CII or CIII type, before merging, the subchannels allotted to the involved nodes are P σ = (the node in outer ring is not reachable under SH and thus gets no sub-channels). After the merging, the number of SC, DC and TC become
> ,this can always be satisfied under the condition of
P' is always greater than P, from now on the proof is similar to the CI case.
Lastly, if the mergence belongs to CIV type, before merging, the sub-channels allotted to the involved nodes are P 2σ = (the node in outer ring gets no subchannels while the one in inner and middle ring each gets P σ = ). After the merging, the number of SC, DC and TC become It's well known in cooperative game theory domain that in a negative externality game there are no opportunities for nodes that don't cooperate to free-ride [11, 17] ; this property provides motivation for nodes to form coalition.
Examples of three-and five-node cases
Consider the case when there are only three active nodes (i.e., |N|=3 and we only consider the special case of MS1, MS2 and MS3 as shown in fig. 1 here, each locates on the respective ring boundary) in the system, then the respective channel apportioning for all feasible ECs, i.e., the partition functions of
are given as follows:
In which zeros in (1, 2, 3) v and (12, 3) v indicate that when no nodes relay for MS3, it can't reach BS by itself and gets no resources, so MS1 and MS2 have all the channels between them.
For the case when there are five nodes (i.e., |N|=5 and we only consider the special case of MS1~MS5 as shown in fig. 1 here, each locates on the respective ring boundary), the partition functions for all feasible CSs 
What a fair Allocation should be -Prediction
Up to now, we have only proposed an allotting policy among coalitions for our MCN system, whether or not nodes will form relaying coalitions, and further which cooperative structure will be formed depends on how the worth v is divided among the nodes. Thus besides the inter-coalition policy, we also have to find an intra-coalition allocating mechanism. To get some insight in this, we would firstly try making some point prediction.
Prediction by Myerson value (MV) for PFG
The Shapley value (SV) [21] has been proven to be a useful solution concept for cooperative characteristic function TU games [25] (CFG, a special coalitional game without externalities) as it provides a recommendation for the division of the joint profits of the grand coalition, which assigns a unique allocation to each game, expresses compromise or average allocation and satisfies some reasonable properties.
The counterpart of SV for PFG was first proposed By R.B. Myerson [24] , who showed that there exists the unique value which satisfies efficiency, symmetry and any one of the marginality axioms. The principle of marginality in PFG which states that one player's payoff should be calculated according to his marginal contribution. MV of PFG is defined as [24] : 
Prediction by Compensated Myerson Value (CMV)
Observe that under the MV mechanism in sub-section 4.1, payoff of MS1 in Eqs.
(4) and (5) equals to that of MS2 and that of MS4 in Eq. (5) equals to MS5. We don't think this fair for our model as nodes in inner ring (e.g., MS1, MS4)
generally cost more in relaying than those in middle ring. We in this sub-section 
By Eq. (6) we get the CMV with respect to λ for |N|=3 as shown in Eq. (7) In a multihop uplink coalition, let the source, relay-I and relay-II (e.g. MS3, MS2
and MS1 in CIV in fig.1 ) share channels in ratio fig. 1 whose size is 2) gets 3 sub-channels, then traffics of the helping node and the helped one occupy 2 and 1 respectively. One interpretation of this Intra-BEA rule is that 'You reap what you sow', i.e., each active node originally has one share of sub-channels, relay-I gets one extra reward (sub-channel) for forwarding on one sub-channel for the source and relay-II acquires 3 extra rewards for forwarding on 3 sub-channels (one for the source and the other two for relay-I), hence we get Eq. Tab.3 and 5 means all the sub-channels a node need to transmit on, including self-traffics and those it relays for others. The stability of a CS is justified in terms of Internal and external stability [13] for |N|=3 and inductive core [18, 22] for |N|=5. 6, and for |N|=5 in tab.7. . These should indicate that in these cases, the energy cost of MS2 is so large that its gains in payoffs are not enough to countervail it. 
Utilities of nodes given

CS stability for |N|=3
It's apparent that all CSs for |N|=3 are single-agreement CS (in which there is only one (non-trivial) coalition), so we can investigate its stability based on the conception of internal and external stability [13] . A CS is said to be stable if it is both internally and externally stable. 
Firstly referring to Tab.8 we see that while [1 | 23] is the best choice of MS3, it is the last choice of MS2, and so it's not internally stable. MS2 would break from[1| 23] to form [1|2|3] and further to cooperate with MS1 to form [12|3], which is the best choice for both MS1 and MS2, indicating that this CS is internally stable. CS [13 | 2] is not internally stable similarly as [1 | 23] . It's noticeable that though the grand coalition[123] isn't internally stable, it's the second best choice for all the members.
CS stability for |N|=5
For |N|=5, as there can be more than one non-trivial coalition in a particular CS, the model belongs to multiple-agreement games and stability conceptions like Internal and external stability aren't applicable here [13] . We adopt instead the inductive Core [18, 22] to investigate stability of multiple-agreement CS in this case.
Informally, the core [22, 23] is the set of un-dominated allocations. An allocation is not in the core if there is a coalition that can profitably deviate from it. In PFGs a deviation by a coalition or a set of coalitions typically affects the payoffs of the residual players thus invoking a response from them. Such a response can change the worth of the deviation dramatically. L, Kóczy in [18, 22] Referring to Tab.9, same as three-node case, we see that while CS [ 
Simulation and numerical results
In the former sections we focus on special cases such as nodes all located on the boundaries (e.g., MS1~MS5 in Fig.1 ).In this section, we examine the applicability and efficiency (in terms of network connectivity and nodes' payoff and energy willing to forward (for those applicants fall within their service area, which are disks centered at the respective relays) and they form coalition according to rules as follows:
As source, a node in outer or middle ring broadcasts its request, and then chooses from the respondents the one with best channel.
As relay, a node in inner or middle ring will accept a request if the applicant located within its service area and it has not yet form a coalition with any source.
Monte Carlo simulation
We define network connectivity as the ratio of the number of nodes which can reach BS to the total number of nodes in the system, the efficiency of a node as the ratio of its payoff to its energy cost, and the MCN relative efficiency of a node as the ratio of its efficiency in MCN to its efficiency in a single-hop network. We investigate the above performance metrics in terms of various nodes' density (i.e., 
Network connectivity
In fig.3 , 'gain of coop' denotes the connectivity difference between cooperative and non-cooperative models. It can be seen that our scheme can generally provides about 20% improvement, and it works better when the number of nodes increase, or when relays set service area bigger, or when the inner ring is wider than outer ring. Note that improvement in connectivity also represents how many nodes in outer ring benefit form forwarding cooperation and thus can set up connection with BS. It might be surmised that if we allow more coalition form (e.g., a relay can forward for multiple nodes in outer ring), the connectivity can be still better. Different from existent researches, we propose an alternative forwarding incentive approach dispensed with indirect monetary rewards, which is simple and light weighted in terms of implementation and maintenance, thus possibly sheds light on stimulating measure design in temporary or emergent circumstances with frequent entry and exit. Analysis and simulation results show that our measure can achieve some tradeoff between connectivity of nodes in outer ring (i.e., network coverage) and utilities of potential relays (i.e., nodes in inner and outer ring).
